Requirements or perceptions of requirements related to antimoney laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) are said to contribute to global unmet demand for trade finance, reducing economic inclusion in regions and markets that need it most.
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific are among the regions most in need of trade financing, and yet, have the most difficulty in accessing it and the critical international trade and development activity it enables.
Trade Finance Scorecard regulaTion and MarkeT Feedback

KEY POINTS
• Preventing criminals and terrorists from using the global financial system is critically important.
• Implementing global regulation across jurisdictions with multiple stakeholders is a challenge, which can have unintended negative consequences.
• The 2017 Trade Finance Gaps, Growth, and Jobs Study of the Asian Development Bank identified unintended consequences from anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulation as an important contributor to global market gaps for small and mediumsized enterprises financing, including in developing countries.
• The Trade Finance Scorecard: Regulation and Market Regulation is the start of a work in progress. It offers three unique features complementary to other efforts to address unintended consequences: -Rather than rating entities associated with creating and implementing AML/ CFT regulation, it scores related issues. -Complementing the Financial Action Task Force and Financial Stability Board work in this area, the Scorecard offers a new diagnostic tool to identify and overcome unintended consequences of AML/ CFT regulations, including their interpretation and implementation. -It provides a new channel facilitated by ADB through which stakeholders can engage to resolve issues. • The Scorecard is not an end in itself, but the beginning of a process. The next step is a workshop with stakeholders to address issues.
These otherwise well-intentioned regulations have made it more expensive and riskier for financial institutions outside the Pacific to maintain relationships within the region, particularly with lesser-known entities such as money transfer operators (MTOs) and small banks. Many of these relationships have been lost.
This hurts [Pacific island countries] in multiple ways. Relationships between financial institutions are essential conduits for money flows. Without them, remittances are more difficult to process and the costs of moving money in and out of the region are high, depriving many families, especially those in remote and poor areas, of an essential financial lifeline. On average, remittances represent 10% of the gross domestic product in the Pacific. In Tonga and Samoa, the figure is more than 20%.
• First, Pacific banks, bank regulators, and MTOs would benefit from more training in due diligence to uncover financial crimes. […]
Collective action is needed to mitigate a breakdown in banking relationships. Addressing the withdrawal of CBRs to prevent detrimental macroeconomic impacts in the small states in the Pacific will entail policy actions by authorities in the small states, in remitter countries, and in the home of global correspondent banks. The small states of the Pacific are currently working to upgrade their AML/CFT frameworks to meet more stringent evaluation of the effectiveness in implementing international standards. But these efforts might not be sufficient to halt or reverse the consequences of withdrawal. Regulators and correspondent banks will also have a role to play. It also links to the foregoing issue on using alternatives to traditional trade financing, noting the connection between the use of cash, which is difficult to trace and track, and some degree of compliance risk.
There is a clear opportunity to pursue capacity building support in the Pacific, whether at industry level in terms of trade finance and related practice (including compliance), or at the level of national regulatory authorities.
The ability to identify and address region-specific issues similar to those listed in this Scorecard requires a degree of domain and technical expertise that is insufficient today in the region.
The Trade Finance Scorecard: Regulation and Market Feedback complements the Trade Finance Gaps, Growth, and Jobs study of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which identifies a global market gap for trade finance at $1.5 trillion, mostly focused on unmet demand from small and medium-sized businesses. Unintended consequences from anti-money laundering and combatting the financing of terrorism measures were identified in the ADB study as a major impediment to closing market gaps for trade finance.
"…. the reduction in the number of correspondent banking relationships continued at the global level in the first half of 2017. While there are no "silver bullets", the actions taken to date under the coordinated FSB [Financial Stability Board] action plan are intended to reverse the global decline. But, in order to do so, they will need to be followed up by national authorities and the banking industry. "The FATF has taken initiatives to make sure that the application of AML/CFT measures does not contribute to de-risking. In order to clarify regulatory expectations, the FATF published guidance on correspondent banking services, and risk-based approach guidance for money and value transfer services, which emphasise that financial institutions should identify, assess and understand their (money laundering/terrorist financing) ML/TF risks, and mitigate them, on a case-by-case basis. FATF's guidance on private sector information sharing also encourages greater collaboration and sharing of information within and among financial institutions."
Financial Action Task Force. 2018. BCBS, CPMI, FATF and FSB welcome industry initiative facilitating correspondent banking. 6 March. http://www. fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/correspondent-bankingstatement-mar-2016.html.
industry engagement through collaboration, and to encourage the collection and provision of data around AML/CFT. Taking a balanced approach with international bodies, regional and national regulators, and industry, is at the heart of the Scorecard. This is not an exercise in faultfinding, but rather the trigger for a new channel of dialogue, engagement, and advocacy around financial sector regulation, specifically related to correspondent banking, trade financing, and, in future iterations, related areas like international remittances.
It is intended that the Scorecard be seen primarily as a presentation of a set of issues that merit specific, concrete action through an engagement channel hosted by ADB. The scores in this edition are directional and illustrative, based upon qualitative assessments that may evolve into a more data-supported process in concert with stakeholders.
Approach
The Scorecard marks the debut of a new tool to identify and overcome challenges linked to global regulation, including their interpretation, implementation, and compliance.
The design of the Scorecard, including the selection of issues on which to focus, is influenced by discussions with informed stakeholders, but also framed in the context of-and in alignment with-the work of the FSB and the FATF on AML/CFT regulation.
The Scorecard is also responsive to the invitation by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for dialogue around key issues in trade financing, including the FSB Action Plan on Correspondent Banking.
The Scorecard focuses on issues related to regulation, and its interpretation, implementation, and compliance with measures designed to avoid money laundering and financing of terrorism in the context of correspondent banking and trade financing. Scores are assigned to Elements of Effective Regulation and issues related to Perceived or Actual Regulatory Requirements. The scope may be adjusted in subsequent editions of the Scorecard and in consultation with stakeholders.
The objective is to launch a process which complements the work of the FSB, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and regulatory authorities around the world, also aligning with the efforts of numerous industry bodies in this space.
In addition to helping drive risk-aligned regulatory practice and reducing unintended adverse consequences of regulation, the Scorecard aims to motivate greater This presentation of priority issues, together with a new engagement process triggered by this initiative, will advance FATF and FSB as well as industry efforts to address challenges with AML/CFT regulation, at the same time contributing to the enhancement of the overall efficacy of AML/CFT regulation. While there are differences in scope and methods, the Scorecard found inspiration in other mechanisms, including FSB Peer Reviews, and shares their objectives.
including correspondent banking and trade financing, on two levels:
(i) Elements of Effective Regulation, where systemic macro issues in the design, implementation, interpretation, and compliance of regulation have created unintended consequences. (ii) Perceived or Actual Regulatory Requirements that at a micro, transaction level is misaligned among the three stakeholder groups listed above, and/or in terms of unintended adverse consequences that need to be addressed.
Scores encompass all levels from global standards, through national regulations, supervision, and enforcement, down to practical implementation and interpretation of regulation by the private sector.
Trade Finance Scorecard: Regulation and Market Feedback
A. Elements of Effective Regulation
The Trade Finance Scorecard: Regulation and Market Feedback identifies seven systemic, macro-level elements that are critical to effective regulation. Some of these elements could be strengthened to mitigate the risk and manifestation of unintended consequences. The following seven elements of effective regulation offer a new diagnostic tool to identify and help address issues related to regulation:
(i) Consistency. How consistent is regulatory guidance, interpretation, and implementation across borders? (ii) Risk alignment. Are regulatory and compliance requirements aligned to the risk character of the activity being regulated?
Contingent on this first edition of the Scorecard measurably adding clarity and driving greater harmonization to AML/CFT-related regulation and implementation, succeeding editions may be published.
Areas for Enhancement
There are clearly areas for further development relative to the Scorecard. These include but may not be limited to:
(i) definitions and descriptions of the issues; (ii) identification, collection, and analysis of relevant data; (iii) design of an agreed process to address root causes of identified issues; (iv) analysis to delve into greater detail on the origins of the issues identified in the Scorecard; and (v) design of a pathway to engage with existing consultation processes.
Structure of the Trade Finance Scorecard: Regulation and Market Feedback
The Scorecard is designed to consider issues related to AML/CFT regulation in international banking, 
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Overall Score* authorities, and regulated entities-are considered. For example, a gap may exist between guidance and/or minimum standards and how banks interpret and/or actually respond to risk-based regulation.
"FATF standards require financial institutions to apply appropriate customer due diligence (CDD) measures. However, FATF is also aware that applying an overly cautious, non risk-based approach to AML/CFT safeguards when providing financial services (both at the on-boarding stage or in the context of ongoing relationships) can have the unintended consequence of excluding legitimate consumers and businesses from the regulated financial system.
To address this concern, in February 2013, FATF adopted Guidance on AML/CFT Measures and Financial Inclusion, updating the guidance it first provided in 2011. The main purpose of the 2013 Guidance was to provide support for designing AML/CFT measures that meet the goal of financial inclusion, without compromising their effectiveness in combating crime. The 2013 Guidance also reflected the changes made to the FATF Recommendations in 2012, in particular the reinforcement of the risk-based approach (RBA 
B. Perceived or Actual Regulatory Requirements
The Elements of Effective Regulation also form the framework for assessments of the following five micro-level transaction issues (Perceived or Actual Regulatory Requirements) stemming from AML/CFTrelated implementation, interpretation, and compliance issues with regulation that inhibits banks from supporting trade and/or correspondent banking:
(i) Party identification. The requirement for trade finance banks to validate the identity or legitimacy of parties involved in a transaction that are not clients or counterparties. For example, validating the identity of a ship's captain transporting financed cargo is an expectation in some parts of the world. This issue is flagged because information on the captain's identity, in this manifestation/example of party identity, is not typically accessible to a financier. As such, compliance is costly, onerous and is seen to contribute to financing gaps. This is not to say that the requirement should or should not exist, but merely to flag the issue and bring stakeholders to agree a way forward. (ii) Price. The need for bankers to validate the reasonableness of product pricing to combat invoice-padding (inflated pricing) and related money laundering activity. For example, validation of prices quoted on commercial invoices to ensure that the quoted price is within a reasonable range and does not mask the movement of illicit funds. This issue is relevant during the course of a transaction as well as post-transaction. (iii) Non-customer due diligence. The degree of due diligence required on non-clients, known as non-customer due diligence is unclear for many stakeholders. This includes, for example, the need for a bank issuing a documentary letter of credit in support of an importing client to conduct sufficient due diligence on a small supplier in a market where the bank has no presence and where tools of due diligence and credit analysis, like audited financial statements or credit reports, may not be available. (iv) Exams. Regulatory bodies set standards and compliance expectations that are meant to be assessed by examiners through periodic audits of bank operations. Some stakeholders report that examiners may impose different requirements than were intended by regulatory bodies which employ the examiners. Differing interpretations of the same regulation has been known to add complexity and cost to the due diligence process and therefore contributes to market gaps. (v) Over-compliance. Banks may mitigate the risk of fines and/or adverse reputational risk by taking measures that go beyond what is required by regulators. These can include engaging in derisking for preventive purposes or refusing to support transactions (often in developing markets) because a lack of data on non-client participants is seen as a risk in terms of due diligence requirements.
The issue of over-compliance is illustrative. While international bodies aspire to articulate a minimum standard of required compliance around aspects of due diligence, for example, some national authorities (as is their prerogative) opt for a more stringent compliance expectation that exceeds the minimum standard and the standard adopted by other jurisdictions. This can cause material regulatory discrepancies, as banks adopt the most stringent compliance standard to minimize the risk of inadvertent failure to comply.
These five issues do not represent a complete list of issues that manifest from unintended consequences, but have been identified as recurring, material, and meriting attention.
